We study the long run outcome when communities with different conventions interact. We introduce the notion of non-exclusive conventions to model the idea that, by incurring some additional costs, agents can remain flexible and hence coordinate their activities more successfully. We show that if these costs of flexibility are low (high) and interaction is local then the Pareto-efficient (risk-dominant) convention prevails in both communities. At intermediate cost levels, the conventions coexist. We also show that the importance of relative size of the two communities varies across interaction structures. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D6, F15, Z1.
INTRODUCTION
In a wide variety of economic and social situations conventions play a central role. Some well known examples of conventions are languages, currencies, product standards and units of measurement. In our view, conventions have two distinctive features: First, a convention is an arbitrary article no. ET972315 solution to a social problem. It is arbitrary in the sense that a convention is typically only one among the many ways to solve the problem at hand. Second, the only reason individuals in a society choose to conform to a particular convention is that others conform to the same convention. These features suggest that a convention can be considered as a solution to a coordination problem or more formally as an equilibrium of a coordination game. 1 We are aware that some of the well known solutions to these coordination problems e.g., U.S. dollars or British pounds, Spanish or Japanese, 110 or 220 voltage, cheques or bank-transfers have emerged while the different societies remained in relative isolation from each other. We are now witnessing an increase in the interaction between members of these societies and this raises the issue: Can these different conventions coexist or will one convention drive out the others, in the long run? In this paper we examine this question by characterizing the long-run outcomes of a dynamic process in which, at the start, individuals belonging to different communities conform to different conventions. 2 Our model has two distinguishing features: non-exclusive conventions and local interaction among individual agents. We first introduce these concepts and then illustrate our results with the help of a simple example. The introduction ends with a discussion of the related literature.
A non-exclusive convention is an equilibrium of a coordination game in which players have the option of choosing actions consistent with several conventions (thereby ensuring coordination), at some additional cost. The idea of non-exclusive conventions is motivated by the observation that people who travel frequently between different societies often speak two or more languages, hold different currencies and carry several credit cards. Such a person remains``flexible'' by incurring some additional costs, e.g., by subscribing to a second credit card. When these costs are (relatively speaking) very high the option of remaining flexible is not worthwhile, and conventions become exclusive.
We refer to interaction between individuals as local if individuals are more likely to meet people in their``neighborhood'' than those``far away'' from them. In contrast, interaction is said to be uniform if an individual is equally likely to meet anybody in the population. The idea of non-uniform interaction is quite general and important in a variety of social and economic settings. Consider, as an example, an individual choosing her telephone network: in this decision, it is more important to check on which network her friends and colleagues are, rather than to look at the general size of the different networks.
Our analysis focuses on the conflict between risk-dominance and Paretoefficiency considerations and our results highlight the role of the cost of remaining flexible and the interaction structure in determining the long-run outcomes. For local interaction, our results may be summarized as follows: if the costs are low, the Pareto-efficient convention drives out the riskdominant convention while the reverse is true when these costs are high. Moreover, if these costs are at an``intermediate'' level then the two conventions can coexist in the long run. Our analysis of the uniform interaction case brings out two points. One, that the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is more likely for low cost levels as compared to high cost levels and two, that the initial configuration plays a relatively more important role under uniform interaction as compared to local interaction. We now illustrate the intuition behind these results in the context of a numerical example.
Example. Consider a research field with 100 active researchers. Assume, to fix ideas, that these researchers are located on the integer points along a line. Each individual has a choice between two electronic networks: : and ;. To be able to use a network, an individual must pay an annual subscription fee of c 1 in the course of a year. A researcher has the option of subscribing to both networks at a higher cost c 2 >c 1 . For our analysis, it is only the difference in these costs that matters, and we consider c=c 2 &c 1 .
We start the analysis in a situation where there are two communities, an : community (say, of game theorists) in which everyone subscribes to the : network and a ; community (say, of evolutionary biologists) in which everyone subscribes to network ;. There are 10 researchers in the first community and 90 in the second one. Researchers in the : group are located at points from 1 to 10 and those in the ; group are located at points from 11 to 100. It is assumed that this group configuration evolved while the two groups were isolated, and we examine what happens when the two groups start interacting (due to the emergence of evolutionary game theory).
Suppose that network : is superior, i.e. everybody would (in principle) prefer to subscribe to :. However, network : performs badly in communicating with network ;. The reverse holds true for network ; : it is not as good as network :, but it communicates better with : than : does with it. Moreover, the quality of interaction is better when two researchers subscribe to the same network than if they subscribe to different networks. These considerations are summarized in the payoff matrix below. It follows that network : Pareto-dominates network ;. On the other hand, since 10&7<8&4, network ; risk-dominates network : in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten [10] . In addition, we assume that a researcher who subscribes to both networks receives a payoff of 10&c when she meets another researcher who subscribes to : or to both networks and 8&c when she meets a researcher subscribing to ; only. The possibility of subscribing to both networks formalizes the idea of non-exclusive conventions.
We will look at two types of interaction among researchers: local and uniform. With local interaction, each individual has a probability of 1Â4 that she will be matched with any of the 2 neighbors on either side of her. 3 In the uniform interaction model, the probability of being matched with anyone else in the population is 1Â99.
We study the evolution of the individual choices over time. These decisions are based on simple rules which may be summarized by saying that individuals choose an action that yields them the highest expected payoff conditional on the belief that the current period distribution of choices will remain the same as in the last period. In our analysis, the social distribution of actions can be summarized by the location of the boundaries between the : and ; regions. We study how the movement of these boundaries depends on the value of c.
We begin with an intermediate case in which c=1. In period 1, individuals expect the boundaries to remain the same as in the initial configuration. Given these expectations, simple calculations reveal that in period 1, the social configuration is that researchers 10 and 11 subscribe to both : and ;, researchers at points 1 9 persist with subscription to : while 12 100 subscribe to ; only. To see why this is the case consider researcher 10: Her expected payoff from subscribing to both : and ; is 8 which is greater than 7 and 7.5, the expected payoff from subscribing to : or ; alone. In period 2, researchers expect the boundary between the : region and the dual subscription region to be between individuals 9 and 10 and the boundary between the dual subscription region and the ; region to be between individuals 11 and 12. Given these expectations, it is easily calculated that in period 2, it is optimal for researchers 1 9 to subscribe to : only, for 10 and 11 to subscribe to both networks, and 12 100 to subscribe to ; only, i.e., nobody has an incentive to change their subscription. This implies that the configuration of period 2 can persist and the two conventions will coexist in the long run. This example illustrates the general point that Theorem 1 makes: if the value of c is``intermediate'' and the initial size of the two communities is``large'' relative to the domain of interaction then Pareto-ranked and risk-ranked conventions can coexist in the long run.
We next consider the case where the cost of dual-subscription is low; suppose c<0.5. In period 1, for researcher 9 the expected payoffs from the different actions are: 8.5 from :, 7.25 from ; and 9.5&c>8.5 from dual subscription. Thus, in addition to researcher 10 and 11, she too will switch to dual subscription in period 1. Analogous computations show that researcher 12 will also switch to dual subscription. Thus, in period 1, researchers 1-8 subscribe to :, 9 12 opt for dual subscription, and 13 100 subscribe to ; only. Taking this configuration as the expectation for period 2, it is easy to see that it is optimal for 9 and 10 to switch back to subscribing to : only, while researchers 11 14 will opt for dual subscription. In period 3, the boundary between the conventions will shift further and 1 12 will subscribe only to :, 13 16 will subscribe to both networks, and 17 100 subscribe to ; and so on. This process will continue and the ; network will be eliminated. This example illustrates the first point point made by Theorem 2: if the costs of dual subscription are``small'' then the risk-dominant convention will be eliminated by a Pareto-efficient convention, in the long run.
Let us finally consider the case when costs of dual subscription are large. For illustration consider c>2. In this case it is easy to see that no one will subscribe to both networks, and we are back within the framework of exclusive conventions. It is now possible to show using calculations analogous to the previous cases that over time the boundaries will move towards 1 and the risk-dominant network will drive out the Pareto-efficient network in the long run. This example illustrates the second point made by Theorem 2.
One way to interpret the option of subscribing to both networks is as an insurance against being matched with a researcher who subscribes to the other network. The value of c can then be considered as an insurance premium. The idea behind the two Theorems on local interaction is then the following. If the insurance premium is relatively low, individuals at the boundary buy the insurance and risk-dominance considerations are not important. The reverse is true for a high insurance premium. At intermediate values of the insurance premium, risk-dominance and Pareto-dominance considerations are equally important and coexistence is dynamically stable.
To clarify the role of the interaction structure in determining long-run outcomes, we also consider the dynamic process under uniform interaction. Given the initial 10 90 split between the two communities, and some c, the expected payoffs of subscribing to :, ; or both networks in period 1 is approximately equal to 4.6, 7.9 and 8.2&c, respectively. If c>0.3 then the best response is for every one to subscribe to ; only, while if c<0.3 then the best response is for every one to subscribe to (:, ;) only and thus eventually to :. In other words, the process converges, with everyone conforming to convention : or ;. This example also suggests that the Paretoefficient equilibrium is``more likely'' when c is smaller, in the sense that the basin of attraction for the Pareto-efficient equilibrium is larger for smaller values of c.
A second point we wish to make concerns the relative importance of the initial size under local and uniform interaction, respectively. To illustrate this suppose that the initial configuration is different from before and that there are 90 researchers on the : network while there are 10 researchers on the ; network. It is easily seen that under local interaction, the long-run outcomes would be identical to those obtained under the (alternative) initial configuration considered above. The outcomes under uniform interaction are greatly altered, however: Simple calculations about the expected payoffs reveal that the Pareto-efficient convention will obtain for all values of c. Thus the initial size of the different networks plays a more prominent role in determining long-run outcomes under uniform interaction as compared to local interaction.
The main purpose of the paper is to show that the arguments concerning the role of the cost, c, and the nature of the interaction structure are quite general and hold for all 2_2 games of interest.
Related literature. This paper is a contribution to the study of the evolution and stability of conventions. Some of the recent work in evolutionary game theory, see e.g., An and Kiefer [1] , Anderlini and Ianni [2] , Blume [4] , Boyer and Orlean [5] , Ellison [7] , Kandori et al. [11] , Sugden [16] and Young [17] , has similar concerns. 4 The present paper is novel in the following respects. One, our model allows for non-exclusive conventions; by contrast, existing work has focussed on the case of exclusive conventions. Two, our model is deterministic; accordingly, the dynamics in our model are different from those studied in the recent evolutionary game theory literature. Three, the present paper focuses on the long-run implications of interaction between two communities with different conventions. This allows us to characterize the dynamic behaviour of the system in terms of a set of difference equations that describe the movement of the boundary between two conventions. 5 
NON-EXCLUSIVE CONVENTIONS
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 contains the principal results pertaining to local interaction, while Section 4 discusses uniform interaction. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. The proofs are given in an appendix.
THE MODEL
We consider an infinite period model where time is indexed by t=0, 1, 2, 3, ... . In each period a unit measure of individuals, uniformly distributed over the circumference of a circle is (randomly) matched pairwise to play a 2 person normal form game. 6 We denote the population of individuals by N and an individual agent by x.
A central feature of our model is the idea that at some cost an individual can become adept at playing many actions. Players decide to invest in (or learn) an action a i # A where A=[:, ;, (:, ;)], prior to being matched with other players. Investing in action : or ; is equally costly but investing in the dual action (:, ;) costs more. Let c denote the difference between these two costs. We assume that c>0. Once an individual makes the choice of which action to invest in, he or she is identified as being of that type. The set of types is also denoted by A=[:, ;, (:, ;)].
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Once matched, players are only allowed to choose an action that they have already invested in. They coordinate on some action if it is feasible, and if they are both of type (:, ;) then they choose to coordinate on the action combination with the highest payoff, i.e. they can solve the coordination problem. Implicit in this formulation is the idea that types can be identified prior to actual play of the game. 8 This assumption seems 40 GOYAL AND JANSSEN 6 The assumption of a unit measure of agents is made to ensure that agents are small; the geometry of the circle is exploited in the definition of the neighborhoods of interaction (see A.2 below). Specifically, it allows us to formulate the neighbourhood of every individual in a natural``symmetric'' way; this is not possible if players are located on a closed interval along a line. 7 Allowing players to play mixed strategies does not change our results and adds to the complexity of the notation. This is because only the individuals on the boundaries between conventions are indifferent between different actions and with a continuum of agents the action of single isolated agents has no impact on the payoffs of the other agents. The evolution of conventions would be essentially the same as reported in Theorems 1 3. reasonable in some settings where communication concerning types is natural, as is the case, for example, in the use of word processing packages, a language or a credit card.
These We are interested in problems of coordination and more specifically in the interaction between Pareto-efficiency and risk-dominance. This motivates the following restrictions on the payoffs:
a>d, b>e; a b, b>d, b&e a&d, and c>0.
(A.1)
Since a>d and b>e, there are two pure strategy equilibria of this game, (:, :) and (;, ;). We shall refer to them as the : and ; convention, respectively. Convention : is said to Pareto-dominate convention ; if a>b and convention ; is said to risk-dominate convention : if b&e>a&d.
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We shall also discuss games in which risk dominance and Paretoefficiency considerations are not in conflict. For this class of games we have the following restrictions on the payoffs: a>d, b>e; a b, b>d, a&d>b&e, and c>0.
The second important feature of our model is the structure of interaction among individual agents. We assume that an individual x only meets individuals drawn randomly from some neighbourhood N(x) N, of where she is located. We define this neighbourhood in terms of the arc length $ # (0, 1Â2] on either side of the point x. We shall use the notation |x, y| to denote the arc length (measured clockwise) between any two points x and y on the circle. This formulation is adapted from the literature on discrete choice models (Anderson et al., [3] ). Formally, for any x # N, the probability of being matched with some y # N is given by a density function f x ( y), where
For $=1Â2, the above assumption on interaction yields uniform interaction, i.e., N(x)=N and the probability of being matched with an agent is independent of her location. For $<1Â2, on the other hand, the probability of interaction depends on the location, and interaction is``local''. This is a simple and rather special model of local interaction; we expect that the proofs of the main results, which exploit the symmetry of f, can be generalized relatively easily. 10 Denote the social configuration of individual choices by s : N Ä A. Given a configuration, s, the expected payoff for individual x from action a i is denoted by ? x (a i | s). For the case of uniform interaction, it depends solely on the aggregate proportion of agents choosing the different actions. So, for example, the expected payoff from action : is expressed as: ? . In case of local interaction, the expected payoff from an action also depends on the precise spatial distribution of these proportions. For the cases of interest, the regions where different actions are played are measurable, and, therefore, the expected payoffs are well-defined. As an illustration, consider the expected payoff to an agent x located on the boundary between two large : and ; regions. The expected payoffs for action : are given by, ? x (: | s)=($a)Â(2$)+($e)Â(2$)=(a+e)Â2. We now define a social equilibrium of this game.
Social equilibrium. A social equilibrium is a configuration of individual choices s^such that
For a fixed parameter vector r=(a, b, c, d, e, $), let the set of social equilibria be denoted by Q r . Social equilibria in which both : and ; are chosen are referred to as coexistence social equilibria and the set of such equilibria is denoted by Q cx r .
Dynamics. We are interested in studying the interaction of societies which conform to different conventions. This motivates our focus on initial configurations, s 0 , in which there exists one :-region and one ;-region, denoted by 1 
;, 2 t , respectively. We shall, without loss of generality, assume that, at t=0, the : region is centered around 0 which is the twelve o'clock point, i.e., |x :, 2 0 , 0|=|0, x :, 1 0 |. 12 An example of such a configuration is given in Fig. 1(a) .
Our analysis will, on occasion, deal with configurations depicted in Fig. 1(b) In every period, individuals choose an action that is a (myopic) best response to their expectations concerning the choices of other individuals. 13 There are different ways in which these expectations may be formed. Individuals may, for instance, access market data from the previous year and use this to forecast the current period's pattern of subscription. In our analysis, we use a simple formulation of expectations formation which captures this idea: we posit that individuals expect the current period's 43 
Thus given s t&1 , (E) and (B) define s t . We study the long-run behaviour of s t and our interest is in the dynamic stability of different types of social equilibria. 15 A set of social equilibria is said to be dynamically 
44
GOYAL AND JANSSEN 14 Several other recent papers have used adaptive expectations to study long-run social learning; for a discussion on some of the issues involved see Mailath [13] , Kandori et al. [11] . Our main results, Theorems 1 3, are robust to some alternative specifications of the dynamics which involve n-period adaptive expections and infrequent individual choices. Under local interaction, players only need to have expectations concerning choices of agents in their neighborhoods. Thus, local information is sufficient to define the expectations in (E). The present formulation has been adopted due to its expositional simplicity. 15 Thus, in principle, different individuals could be making their decisions at different points within an interval of time, e.g. renewing their subscription for a credit card at different dates in the same calender year. The crucial assumption is that all individuals must use the expectations as defined in (E). This is reasonable since market statistics concerning performance of different products are only released at regular intervals which may be interpreted as coinciding with our time periods. 16 Recall that Q cx r refers to the set of coexistence equilibria. This requirement of dynamic stability is weaker than the more familiar requirement that every s^# Q cx r has a basin of attraction. In our setting, this weaker requirement is suitable, since there are a continuum of coexistence equilibria and we are primarily interested in the issue of whether coexistence is stable.
We start by characterizing a class of coexistence social equilibria, in which interaction between regions conforming to different conventions is mediated by a set of individuals who invest in both actions (as in Fig. 1(b) ). The payoffs from different actions are continuous in x. Hence, in equilibrium, for agent x :, 1 , the costs of investing in both actions must be exactly offset by the benefits of doing so. In other words, Some remarks on the nature of coexistence follow. First, we observe that coexistence is only possible for non-generic values of c. It is worth emphasizing that this is an artifact of the assumption of a continuum of agents. The robustness of coexistence is related to the degree of overlap of neighborhoods of boundary individuals: specifically, the more similar these neighborhoods, the smaller the potential range of values of c for which coexistence is feasible. In the continuum model, the neighborhoods of boundary individuals are (in a measure-theoretic sense) identical and this generates the non-genericity observed in Proposition 1. In finite agent models neighborhoods will typically be distinct and coexistence more robust. 18 Second, note that b&e>a&d is consistent with 2c(d&e)= (a&b)(b&e), implying that risk-ranked conventions can coexist in equilibrium. Finally, note that since the boundaries of the regions are such that they equate the benefits from dual subscription with the costs of doing so, an increase in c must be compensated by a greater reward from dual subscription, i.e., a greater likelihood of meeting individuals who can do only ; or only :. Thus an increase in c implies a decrease in the sizes of 1 (:, ;) (1) and 1 (:, ;) (2). Theorem 1 shows that if 2c(d&e)=(a&b)(b&e) then, under local interaction, the set of coexistence social equilibria Q cx r is dynamically stable. . This is useful since the movement of boundaries is captured by a set of simple difference equations so long as the : and ; regions are``large''. 20 The proof of Theorem 1 then uses two arguments, both of which exploit the hypothesis that 2c(d&e)=(a&b)(b&e). The first argument shows that if the regions are large initially then they will remain large over time, while the second argument shows that the solution to the difference equations is a converging sequence of boundaries and the limit is a coexistence equilibrium as characterized in Proposition 1.
We now turn to an examination of the case where 2c(d&e){(a&b) (b&e). The first interesting result in this case is that if the cost c is``low'' then only the Pareto-efficient convention survives, in the long run. By contrast, for high values of c, the risk-dominant convention prevails. 21 Let I r denote the interval of initial configurations in which |1 19 An analysis of the pure coordination case in which a=b and d=e is available from the authors upon request. 20 In particular, the difference equations can be used if |1
: 0 | and |1
; 0 | are both bigger than $+2$(1&(2c)Â(b&e)). This is feasible if 2[$+2$(1&(2c)Â(b&e))] 1, a requirement that is satisfied for all c>0, if $ 1Â6. If $>1Â6, then it is satisfied so long as c>(b&e)(3Â4& 1Â(8$)). These considerations explain the restrictions on the value of c. 21 This conclusion is similar to Theorem 1 in Ellison [7] . 22 Note that given (A.1), 2c(d&e)<(a&b)(b&e) is satisfied only if a>b. Thus : is the Pareto-efficient convention in this case.
(ii) If 2c(d&e)>(a&b)(b&e) then all players conform to the risk-dominant convention after a finite period.
The proof of Theorem 2 exploits the same set of difference equations for the boundaries between regions as Theorem 1. In part (i), the boundaries x ;, 1 t and x ;, 2 t are, roughly speaking, strictly increasing and strictly decreasing, respectively. Thus the size of the ; region shrinks while the size of the : region expands over time. In part (ii), the opposite trend is observed. In both cases, the process leads to the emergence of a single convention for both communities. The proof of this result follows from two observations: one, that so long as 2c<b&e, the hypothesis (A.1$) implies the inequality 2c(d&e)<(a&b) (b&e) and two, that if 2c>b&e then no individual optimally chooses the action (:, ;) and from standard arguments, the process converges to the risk-dominant convention. This implies that under (A.1$), only the : convention survives in the long run. Thus when there is no conflict between risk-dominance and Pareto-efficiency considerations the value of c is not important. 24 
UNIFORM INTERACTION
In this section we will analyze the dynamic process under uniform interaction. This analysis is based on the computation of the basins of attraction 47 NON-EXCLUSIVE CONVENTIONS 23 At some finite point in time when the shrinking region becomes sufficiently small, the difference equations are no longer adequate to describe the movement of boundaries. This is because the difference equations are derived under the assumption that the : and ; regions are sufficiently large so that the analysis of the movement of one boundary can be carried out independently of the movement of the other. The proof of Theorem 2 provides additional arguments showing that when a region becomes very small, it will eventually disappear. 24 It is worth adding that Theorems 2 and 3 do not require the full force of the hypothesis, s 0 # I r . for instance, the conclusion of Theorem 2(i) obtains under the weaker condition, |1
: 0 | >$+2$(1&(2c)Â(b&e)). We retain the stronger hypothesis only to maintain consistency with Theorem 1. Figure 2 of the different social equilibria. In recent years, uniform interaction has been studied extensively and these computations are relatively well-known. The presentation is accordingly brief and informal. The basins of attraction depend upon the values of the parameters, a, b, c, d, e. An illustrative example of the basins of attraction is presented in Fig. 2 for the case in which a coexistence equilibrium exists.
This figure is obtained by deriving the locus of points at which individual agents are indifferent between different actions. Thus the segment AB is the locus of proportions at which ? x (: | s)=? x (; | s) and is defined by p ; = (a&b)Â(a&e)+ p : (b&d )Â(a&e). The line segment CD is the locus of points at which ? x (: | s)=? x ((:, ;) | s) and is defined by p ; =cÂ(b&e). Finally, line segment FG, which is the locus of points at which actions ; and (:, ;) are equally attractive, is defined by p ; =1&cÂ(a&b)+ p : (b&d)Â(a&b). In the figure, I(:), I( ;) and I(:, ;) denote the basins of attraction of configurations (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1), respectively. It is important to note that the social configuration in which everyone chooses (:, ;), (0, 0, 1), lies in the basin of attraction of (1, 0, 0). Thus I(:, ;) is actually a subset of the basin of attraction of the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. Given A.1, it is immediate that the slope of FG is larger than the slope of AB and this implies that a coexistence equilibrium is only possible if these line segments have the configuration depicted in Fig. 2 .
It is now easy to see that starting from any s 0 # I(:) under (E) and (B), p t =(1, 0, 0) for all t 1. Similar arguments establish that starting from s 0 # I(;), p t =(0, 1, 0) for all t 1. Finally, if s 0 # I(:, ;) then under (E) and (B) every player chooses (:, ;) in period t=1 implying that p (:, ;) 1 =1. Under (E), E(s 2 | s 1 )=s 1 and it follows from (B) that p 2 =(1, 0, 0). From this it is immediate that the coexistence equilibrium is dynamically unstable under uniform interaction.
A second observation pertains to the role of cost the c in determining long-run outcomes. From the expressions for AB, CD and FG and Fig. 2 , it is easily seen that the size of I(:), I( ;) and I(:, ;) are related to the level of c. Thus if c is lowered then I(;) shrinks while the effective basin of attraction for : which is the complement of the set I( ;) expands. In this sense the Pareto-efficient equilibrium can be said to become more likely as the level of c declines. 25 Note that under local interaction low values of c also favour convergence to the Pareto-efficient equilibrium.
Our third observation pertains to the relative importance of the initial size of different regions in determining long-run outcomes. To illustrate this point consider high and low values of c. When the cost is large, say c>(b&e)Â2 then the dual-action is never optimal and yet for initial values of s 0 # I(:) the dynamic process s t Ä (1, 0, 0) , the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. In contrast, there are low values of this cost, say c<(a&b)Â2, where I( ;) is non-empty and for any s 0 # I( ;) the dynamic process s t Ä (0, 1, 0), the risk-dominant equilibrium. Comparing these results to Theorems 2 and 3 of the previous section leads us to the conclusion that the initial size of the : and ; regions plays a more important role under uniform interaction than under local interaction.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have argued that when a community with a Pareto-efficient convention interacts with a community with a risk-dominant convention, the costs of becoming adept in both conventions play an important role in determining if one convention prevails over the other or if the conventions coexist. Our analysis shows that when these costs are low then the Pareto-efficient convention prevails in both communities eventually, while the risk-dominant convention prevails for high cost levels. For intermediate cost levels the two conventions coexist.
Our argument was developed with the help of a simple dynamic model. Two features of this model the interaction structure and the dynamic process of individual choice deserve special mention. We assumed that individuals are located around a circle and interact only with some interval of agents around them. We also supposed that individual choice was defined by a form of myopic best response. We have considered alternative formulations to check for the robustness of our findings. In particular, we find that a similar result obtains if interaction is two-dimensional and individuals are located on a torus. We also examined a variety of extensions with other versions of the best response dynamic, which involved n-period adaptive expectations and infrequent strategy revision rules. 26 Our analyses suggest that the basic intuition concerning the role of these costs is sound. 
and for x # [0, x$), since |1
: 0 | >$+D : , : yields a higher payoff than (:, ;) and ;. These arguments enable us to define 
Similar arguments show that the other boundary points may be defined as 
From Eqs. (7) (10) it is immediate that x Case (i). In this case, the payoff computations can be made using the same general principles as in stage 1. In particular, at x ;, 1 2 the payoffs from action ; and action (:, ;) must be equal and this implies that 
We proceed assuming that (C) holds; the effects of relaxing (C) are considered later.
It is easily seen that in both case (i) and (ii) 
We focus on the sub-process [x :, 1 t , x ;, 1 t ] and begin by noting that the behaviour of the sequence is captured by (14) and (16 Case (ii). This is the more general case where (19) (20) are not satisfied but (23) (24) are satisfied. In this case, the argument used for case 1 does not apply and convergence to the : convention may not be immediate. We use an indirect argument. This argument is quite simple but tedious, so we provide a sketch only: We begin by noting the main difference between the two cases: in case (ii), |1 , where, for example, xÄ ;, 1 t is the hypothetical boundary calculated by using (19) (22) over time. Convergence now obtains as a corollary of the convergence of the xÄ B t process, which is established below. It then only remains to show that at some finite point the inequalities in (19) (20) will be violated. The proof proceeds by way of contradiction. Suppose not. Focus, without loss of generality, on the inequality in expression (19). Note that so long it is not violated, the process [x ;, 1 t ] is defined using the formula given by Eq. (19).
Note that since 2c(d&e)<(a&b)(b&e), it follows that D ; &(b&d)Â (a&d) D : >0. We know from the proof of Lemma 1.2 that the homogeneous component converges. Moreover, the particular solution of the difference equation is of the form Kt, with K>0, and so the particular solution will dominate and determine the behaviour of the sequence [x ;, 1 t ], in the long run. Thus, the sequences x ;, 1 t and x ;, 2 t are, respectively, increasing and decreasing without bound, in the long run. This implies that there is some finite point t at which (19) is violated, which contradicts our supposition.
Q.E.D. This does not, however, complete the proof since the ; convention may be strictly Pareto-dominated by convention : and if the (:, ;) region is very large then it may become optimal for some individuals to switch back to :. It is possible to show that, in the long run, this cannot happen. We provide a sketch of the proof for this claim.
Proof of Theorem
The first step is to show, using arguments analogous to Theorem 2(i), that the actual sequence [x
